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The Right to a Fair Trial
Danny J. Boggst

In reviewing the topics for our forum about the challenges
that confront society and the law in guaranteeing and defining "a
fair trial," I was reminded of the story that was told about General Curtis LeMay, the noted (or notorious, depending on your
politics) Commander of the Strategic Air Command in the late
1940s and 1950s.
A young officer, to whom had been entrusted some difficult
task, reported to the General and stated, "Sir, we have encountered an insurmountable obstacle in carrying out your orders."
The cigar-chomping General removed his stogie, blew smoke
in the young man's face and bellowed, "Son, in my command, we
don't have any obstacles. All we have are opportunities."
Quick as a wink, the officer (obviously a Chicago-trained lawyer) responded, "Yes, Sir. We have encountered an insurmountable opportunity, Sir!"
Whether or not they will turn out to be insurmountable, the
three issues that will be addressed in this symposium can be seen
as representing obstacles to a fair trial, but they can also be seen
as opportunities to improve both our fair trial rights and our
overall system of justice. Thus, some commentators will argue
that each of these general syndromes are obstacles to a fair trial:
(1) excessive publicity, through media coverage and otherwise; (2)
an increasing awareness of race and increasing use of raceconscious arguments and cues; and (3) increasingly detailed procedures, with drastic consequences for even small deviations.
On the other hand, each of them can be seen as an opportunity - either specifically for a better or fairer trial in the courtroom, or for a better understanding and appreciation of our justice system and fair trials in the broader society. For example:
0 Greater public awareness of and vicarious participation in
high-profile trials could be a benefit of greater media attention. Jurors who actually serve usually come away with an
I Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. A.B., Harvard
University, 1965; J.D., The University of Chicago, 1968. This speech is based on a transcript of remarks delivered at The University of Chicago Legal Forum Symposium, November 7-8, 1997. Although edited for publication, this paper retains the informal format
of the original venue.
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enhanced understanding of and respect for our justice system.
Perhaps seeing the system operate in practice in the media
could do that as well.
0 The heightened awareness of the role of race in our trial system could be seen as an opportunity to integrate more fully
people who have felt a sense of exclusion from the system. It
could also be seen as an avenue to overcoming sources of error
or unfairness.
e And, it may be possible that new or different procedures could
lead us to fairer trials.
In short, in each of these three areas, as well as others involved in our trial system, the question is how to maximize the
opportunity that they present, while minimizing the obstacles
that they pose.
I. DEFINING THE FAIR TRIAL

The first question that confronts a speaker asked to keynote
this broad topic is this: Does a fair trial depend strictly on what
happens in the courtroom and in the attendant legal system that is, on the results in individual cases? Or does "fair trial" also
encompass both the effects and perceptions in the wider society?
I know that some of the speakers tomorrow will be looking at the
wider context, but I will primarily take the narrow view that a
fair trial and, even more, the right to a fair trial, is the property
of the defendant, and that what happens to the individual defendant is the measure of a fair trial. Thus, by my definition, if a
trial is, in reality, a fair trial (depending on what that means, as I
will discuss later), then the fact that the perception of the trial
has caused various types of social ills may call for solutions in
other areas of the society, but it is not an appropriate criticism of
the fairness of the trial itself.
I also want to make a preliminary point about the difference
between a fair trial and the right to a fair trial. In any individual
case, there may be some things central to the legal concept of the
right to a fair trial that are shaded, modified, or even omitted
altogether, and yet the overall effect may be a metaphysically fair
trial. Sometimes these discrepancies are covered by the doctrine
of harmless error; in other cases, the rights, while generally of
great significance, have little impact in the particular case. Yet
our society and our Constitution generally have made the judgment that the measure of a fair trial is its adherence to stated
processes. We may believe that this will ultimately lead to the
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fairest outcome, but we are certainly aware that in any given case
the vindication of the right to a fair trial may not be exactly the
same as a fair or correct outcome.
Since text and history are always a good starting place for a
judge, I thought I would look first at the origin of "fair trial" as a
term and concept. The term "fair trial" does not appear in the
Constitution, despite at least one exuberant law review author
who stated that the right to a fair trial is specifically accounted
for in the Constitution itself.' But many writings contemporaneous with the framing of the Constitution spoke of the concept of a
fair trial and frequently discussed it in terms that themselves
were to become parts of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
In my search for the first use of the term "fair trial" in the United
States Reports, I found the 1784 Pennsylvania case of Respublica
v De Longchamps,2 which referred to the defendant as having put
himself "upon the country; an unbiased jury, upon a fair trial,
and clear evidence, [had] found [him] guilty.' 3
Most of the other early references I found simply used "fair
trial" as a synonym for the right enshrined in the Constitution to
trial by jury. Trial by jury was a fair trial in the common law
sense, and the processes encompassed within the meaning of trial
by jury necessarily embody the concept of a fair trial.
My old Black's Law Dictionary defines "fair trial" in terms of
language drawn primarily from two Eighth Circuit cases, Goldstein v United States4 and Sunderland v United States,5 which
read as follows:
The term "fair trial" is often used, but not often defined [a
truism, as you will find]. It is of broad scope. While we
shall not undertake to give a formal definition of the term,
yet it may not be amiss to mention, in part at least, its
content.... It means a trial before an impartial judge, an
impartial jury, and in an atmosphere of judicial calm....
Being impartial means being indifferent as between the
parties.6

I Leonard Pertnoy, The Juror'sNeed to Know vs The ConstitutionalRight to a Fair
Trial, 97 Dickinson L Rev 627, 627 (1993) ("The right to a fair trial is a guarantee so
fundamental that it was specifically accounted for by the Constitution itself.").
2 1 US (1 Dallas) 111 (Pa Ct Oyer & Terminer 1784).
Id at 115.
' 63 F2d 609 (8th Cir 1933).
' 19 F2d 202 (8th Cir 1927).
' See Goldstein, 63 F2d at 613; and Sunderland, 19 F2d at 216.

4

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1998:

Another definition states it as: "A hearing by an impartial and
disinterested tribunal; a proceeding which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only
after trial."7 And yet one more states:
A fair and impartial trial by a jury of one's peers contemplates counsel to look after one's defense, compulsory attendance of witnesses, if need be, and a reasonable time in
the light of all prevailing circumstances to investigate,
properly prepare, and present the defense. One wherein
defendant is permitted to be represented by counsel and
neither witnesses nor counsel are intimidated.8
But in all these general ways, I think the traditional view is
essentially, though not exclusively, a search for the truth. The
characteristics set out above - an impartial decision maker, an
atmosphere conducive to consideration, with relevant evidence
considered and irrelevant evidence excluded - are aimed primarily at improving the chances of arriving at a verdict that accords with some notion of preexisting, objective truth. Of course,
if you dispute the notion of objective truth, as some do, this may
be problematic; but I will not try to enter into that fray today.
II. FAIR FOR THE GUILTY OR FOR THE INNOCENT?

Although the system is designed to give defendants various
rights, so that the chance of an incorrect conviction is minimized,
nothing in the traditional view indicates that the defendant deserves a "sporting chance" at acquittal if he is actually guilty.
Such a perception may be a result of a system that is designed to
prevent abuse of government power, but it is not part of the traditional model. We hope to convict the guilty and to avoid convicting the innocent. At the same time we recognize that a fair
trial is not always a perfect trial. The system accepts with relative equanimity the notion that some people who are objectively
guilty will not be convicted. The very notion of guilt "beyond a
reasonable doubt" contemplates, and even glories in, that principle.
At the same time, any dispassionate and informed observer
must be willing to concede that some innocents will be convicted.
In practice, the system can live with that as well. ErrorBlack's Law Dictionary717-18 (West 4th ed 1951).
Id at 718.
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correction mechanisms, through appeal and later opportunities at
redress, are designed in part to deal with such mistakes. But we
know that in any system of human decision-making, errors will
still persist.
One relevant question, as we look at criticisms of existing
practice and proposed alternatives, is how the proposed reforms
will alter the numbers and balance of those errors. It is a commonplace from Blackstone that it is better that ten guilty escape
than one innocent be punished.9 While that is a nice rhetorical
point, I don't think the legal system has ever explicitly tried to
come to grips with whether that number, ten, is the right number. Would it be better for it to be more or less? Interestingly,
other noted commentators have rhetorically used quite different
numbers. Voltaire suggested that only one or two true criminals
should go free in order to avoid convicting one innocent person.' °
Franklin suggested a hundred," and Maimonides, a thousand.'2
If we have rather different reactions to each of those numbers, it might be well for everyone commenting in this area to
search their hearts and minds as to what is an acceptable balance
of errors in favor of guilt and in favor of innocence. While it may
seem a bit cold-hearted or cold-blooded to do so, in fact we are
operating a system in which there is an unknown but discoverable relationship of those two numbers. These are, of course, the
kinds of errors that statisticians would call Type I errors (convicting the innocent) and Type H errors (acquitting the guilty),
and their relative balance should be a consideration in contemplation of changes in the system or improvement in the system.

William M. Blackstone, 4 Commentaries 358.
' Voltaire, Zadig; Or, The Book of Fate 53 (Garland 1974) (Claude de Crebillon,
trans) ("tis much more prudence to acquit two persons, tho' actually guilty, than to pass
Sentence of Condemnation on one that is virtuous and innocenf); Voltaire, Zadig and
Other Romances 21 (Dodd, Mead & Co 1926) (H. I. Woold and Wilfrid S. Jackson, trans)
("it is better to try to save a guilty man than to condemn an innocent"). See also Dan
Gifford, The Conceptual Foundationsof Anglo-American Jurisprudence in Religion and
Reason, 62 Tenn L Rev 759, 761 n 6 (1995).
" Benjamin Franklin, 9 The Writings of Benjamin Franklin 293 (MacMillan 1906)
(Albert Henry Smyth, ed) ("That it is better 100 guilty Persons should escape than that
one innocent Person should suffer, is a Maxim that has been long and generally approved."); see also Gifford, 62 Tenn L Rev at 761 n 6.
12 Maimonides, 2 The Commandments Commandment No 290 at 270 (Soncino 1967)
(Charles B. Chavel, trans) ("it is better and more satisfactory to acquit a thousand guilty
persons than to put a single innocent man to death"); see also Irene Merker Rosenberg
and Yale L. Rosenberg, In the Beginning: The Talmudic Rule Against Self-Incrimination,
63 NYU L Rev 955, 1039 n 304 (1988).
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III. Is THERE SUCH A THING AS A FAIR OUTCOME?

A second interesting computation that arises here is the
proper number or proportion of acquittals in a system of truly fair
trials, as well as the proper proportion of guilty pleas to trials.
Some have said that trials are the least important part of the system, because perhaps 90 percent of cases never go to trial.13
I first thought we might say that the truly proper number of
convictions at trial would be 100 percent. People should not be
brought to trial unless they are in fact guilty, and the prosecution
has the means to prove them so. This might seem utopian in one
sense, and of course an alternative theory would say that the
proper number of acquittals is 100 percent. Those who are guilty,
and who would surely be convicted at trial, should all plead
guilty, and the only cases left to go to trial would be those where
the innocent correctly maintain their innocence. Now either of
these idealistic conceptions, of course, is unlikely to be realized in
practice, and a subtle application of game theory might give us a
more nuanced exposition of the proper proportion. But these
thoughts sharply emphasize the question of what our ultimate
goals should be in contemplating an overall trial system.
IV. A PICTURE OF TRIALS IN THE UNITED STATES
There is some empirical evidence for what our present system
gets us at trial. Federal court figures in both jury and bench trials for conviction and acquittal rates exist for the past fifty
years. 14 I want to stop here to mention that generally when we
talk about the interesting issues of criminal trials (and particularly fair criminal trials), we think of jury trials. But the role of
bench trials is a large and important one - and I think larger
than most people realize. We know, of course, that a change in
the rules of trial may seem to raise or lower conviction percentages, and we may argue over whether such changes make the
system more "fair," depending on whether a change truly serves a
truth-seeking function, or is only of generic advantage to the defense or to the prosecution. At the same time, however, since the
See, for example, Angelique M. Paul, Turning the Cameraon Court TV: Does Televising Trials Teach Us Anything About the Real Law?, 58 Ohio St L J 655, 666-67 (1997)
(discussing studies showing that high percentages of civil and criminal cases never reach

trial).
"4 These figures are reported annually in Judicial Business of the United States
Courts (Admin Office US Cts) and under the earlier title, Administrative Office of the
United States Courts:Annual Report of the Director(Admin Office US Cts).
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large majority of all cases are resolved before trial, either by
guilty plea or dismissal, 5 a change in the rules or cultural norms
that will alter the nature and number of cases that enter the trial
pool is likely to have a profound effect on those total numbers.
And, of course, a change in the rules of trial may affect the proportion of people who will choose to undertake the trial.
These are the numbers I found. First, at the state level in
1992, about 50 percent of felony trials leading to conviction were
bench trials and 50 percent were jury trials. 6 This ratio is affected by the type of case: murder cases were four to one jury
trials, while drug possession cases were over four to one bench
trials."
In the federal system, the balance today is overwhelmingly in
favor of jury trials, although there have been interesting changes
in that pattern. 8 Bench trials represented the majority of federal
criminal trials until the 1960s. Starting in the late 1960s, the
proportion of jury trials mounted steadily, to the point that jury
trials now represent well over 80 percent of all criminal trials.
But at the same time, the relative proportion of acquittals in
bench and jury trials also shifted. In the earlier years, there were
very substantial proportions of acquittals in both areas, but acquittal rates were consistently lower in bench trials. As we came
closer to the present, both figures shifted in opposite directions.
Between 1991 and 1995, only 20 percent of federal jury trials
ended in acquittal, down from 36 percent in the post-World War
II decade to 24 percent in the seventies. By 1995 the acquittal
rate was down to 16 percent. The rate of acquittals in bench trials started out at 10 percent in the late 1940s, rising fairly steadily into the twenties, until the last five years, when the percentage of acquittals in federal bench trials skyrocketed to 49 percent.
This may, of course, simply reflect a strategic shift as defendants who are in fact guilty opt for jury trials, in the belief, mistaken or not, that they have a better chance of bamboozling the
jury. Defendants in situations where they may have a clear and
logical claim of innocence, on the other hand, may feel more confident in convincing a judge of that fact.
If this is the case, the rising conviction rate in jury trials may
See Leonidas Ralph Mecham, JudicialBusiness of the United States Courts 235
(Admin Office US Cts 1995) ("1995 Report").
" Kathleen Maguire and Ann L. Pastore, eds, Sourcebook of CriminalJustice Statistics - 1995 498 (GPO 1996) ("1995 Sourcebook").
17 Id.
"

The statistics in this paragraph are from 1995 Sourcebook at 476.
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not mean a shift either in the attitudes of juries or in the playing
field created by the rules, but may mean simply that the group of
cases being taken to a jury has increasingly involved defendants
who are guilty and whose guilt can be proved. I cannot take a
firm position on this, but I think these are intriguing areas for
further commentary and scholarship.
As one might expect, defendants demand jury trials much
more frequently in cases involving serious crimes. A survey of
state convictions in 1992 showed that murder cases represented
just 1 percent of felony convictions, but 11 percent of convictions
after jury trials. "9 Rape cases represented 2.4 percent of all felony convictions, but over 8 percent of felony convictions after jury
trial. At the other end of the spectrum, convictions on the more
minor crimes of drug possession (and even drug trafficking) were
overwhelmingly concentrated in bench trials.
Another very interesting fact revealed by the figures is that
the popular impression that criminal trials are increasing in
length (which is of course fed largely by the mega-trials of the
O.J. Simpson or McMartin preschool variety),21 is quite justified.
The figures from 1987 to 1995 show that federal criminal trials
have lengthened significantly. 21 In 1987-88, the modal number of
trial days, that is, the length of time for the largest single group
of trials, was one day. By 1995, it was two days. The median
number of trial days, that is, the number where half the trials
were longer and half the trials were shorter, had risen from less
than a day and a half to more than two and a half days, in just an
eight-year period. Perhaps the most significant increase was in
the proportion of extremely lengthy trials. While still fairly
small, this proportion had risen sharply. Trials of more than
twenty days rose from 1.3 percent of all trials to 2.3 percent,
nearly doubling, while trials of 10-19 days actually did double,
from 3 percent to 6 percent. These increases contributed to the
fact that the average length of trials rose 50 percent, from 3.2
days to 4.7 days. Whether this can be laid at the feet of overproceduralism, increased voir dire, greater complexity, or other facThe statistics in this paragraph are from 1995 Sourcebook at 498 (cited in note 16).
The criminal trial of 0. J. Simpson lasted more than nine months, and the trial in
the McMartin case lasted almost three years. See The Verdict is in: A City Divided; The
Simpson Trial has Raised Questions of Police Propriety and Racial Antipathy, LA Times
8B (Oct 4, 1995); Bruce Buursma, LA child abuse case ends in acquittals,Chi Trib 1A (Jan
19, 1990).
" The statistics in this paragraph are taken from 1995 Report at 364 (cited in note
15); and Leonidas Ralph Mecham, 1988 Annual Report of the Directorof the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 230 (GPO 1988).
"
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tors, is something that I believe also warrants considerable further research if we are to understand how the criminal jury system really operates. Are these increasingly lengthy trials (and
these are numbers from federal court where, I believe, courts
have been freer of the monster mega-trial) actually contributing
to or detracting from a fair trial?
V. OPPORTUNITIES AND OBSTACLES

Having set out some thoughts on the wide metaphysical issue
of a fair trial, let me turn directly to the three opportunities, or
obstacles, that are posed by the issues raised in this forum.
I will try to do this in a somewhat provocative fashion, both to
earn my keep and to keep my contract with Dean Baird and the
Legal Forum, and also to raise some considerations that you may
wish to keep in the back of your mind as you consider the papers
of the participants. I will also beg indulgence here, as I am commenting based on necessarily incomplete information, and since I
am only one person commenting on approximately ten papers.
A. The First Amendment in the Courthouse
Turning to the subject of the first panel, I find the issues of
the First Amendment in the courthouse to be at once the most
interesting, and perhaps the least relevant, to the American system of fair trial. Almost by definition these issues will arise in
the context of situations of great human interest. If the cases
were uninteresting, the news media would not create the conditions that raise the prospect of a conflict between First Amendment rights and the right to a fair trial. But, by their very nature, such trials cannot happen very often. Though we have seen
a "trial of the century" much more often than once every hundred
years, I think it would be fair to say that cases of overwhelming
national attention might happen, at most, once every year or two,
and within any given local area with perhaps the same or lesser
frequency.
In my own home area, I could immediately think of only two
trials in the past decade where major First Amendment issues
might have been raised. This judgment was somewhat vindicated when I surveyed a number of local lawyers and acquaintances, each of whom first came up with the same two cases, plus
of course one or two others in which they perceived overwhelming
interest - always cases they had participated in, but that none of
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the other people surveyed thought had attracted the same degree
of attention. This does not, of course, mean that the First
Amendment issues are unimportant, either for the individuals
involved or for our perception of the trial system. I simply make
this point to indicate that public pressure and prejudice is not a
problem that pervades or undermines the overall workings of our
trial system in any significant way. At the same time, to the extent that these extraordinary cases color the public perception of
the trial system, they can have important consequences both by
bolstering or undermining confidence in the system and by having an effect on public support or demand for legislative change.
By way of analogy, let me just mention those two local cases,
from my hometown of Louisville, Kentucky, because they at least
add a little color to this discussion.
One of them involved a man named Joseph Wesbecker, who
was a disgruntled employee of our local newspaper. He walked
into the newspaper building (which is right across the street from
our courthouse) with a duffel bag containing an AK-47, and proceeded to kill eight people, wound twelve, and ultimately kill
himself.22 Obviously, there was not going to be a criminal trial in
that case. There was, however, a civil trial against the makers of
Prozac, which Mr. Wesbecker was taking at the time.2 Given the
human interest of the victims from the very community, as well
as the involvement of the newspaper itself, this trial naturally
created an immense storm of public attention.
The second case merits a somewhat more detailed description
simply because it is both interesting and raises a number of fair
trial issues.'
In September of 1988, a young woman named
Brenda Sue Schaefer disappeared. Her car was found on the
highway, but no trace of Schaefer herself was found. Suspicion
' Jim Adams, Joseph T. Wesbecker: the Long Dark Slide 1942-1989, Courier-J (Louisville) 1A (Dec 31, 1989).
' Leslie Scanlon, Lilly Gives In, CallsDeal A Settlement of the Prozac Case, CourierJ (Louisville) 1B (Mar 25, 1997).
2
The facts about this case are contained in various reports in Louisville's CourierJournalover the last ten years. Particularly informative articles include: Cary B. Willis,
Ignatow Lawyer Says Release of Tape Should Rule Out Death, Courier-J (Louisville) 1A
(February 7, 1990); Gideon Gil, License Panel Disciplines Doctor who Threatened Man
Charged in Schaefer Death, Courier-J (Louisville) 5B (Oct 3, 1990); Cary B. Willis and
Andrew Wolfson, Key Tape Allowed to be Evidence at Ignatow's Trial, Courier-J (Louisville) 1B (Nov 21, 1991); Leslie Scanlon, Kenton Jury Acquits Ignatow in Death of Fiancee
Schaefer, Courier-J (Louisville) 1A (Dec 22, 1991); Deborah Yetter, Federal Grand Jury
Indicts Ignatow on Perjury Charge, Courier-J (Louisville) IA (Jan 9, 1992); Andrew Wolfson, Finding Evidence in Home a Fluke, Courier-J (Louisville) 1A (Oct 3, 1992); and Kim
Wessel, Ignatow Will Face Another Charge of Perjury, Courier-J (Louisville) 1A (Oct 24,
1997).
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immediately focused on an older man, Mel Ignatow, who had
been her boyfriend of some duration and who had been seen
having lunch with her the day before the car was found. But despite considerable investigation for more than a year, no great
progress was made. As an aside, during this time, the woman's
former employer was convicted of terroristic threatening for
threatening to kill the suspect if he did not confess.
Eventually, however, the police were able to find and then, to
some extent, turn a former girlfriend. The ex-girlfriend wore an
FBI microphone to a meeting with Ignatow, and recorded several
incriminating statements along the line of: "Believe me: That's
not shallow, that place we dug; that's not shallow," and encouraging her not to speak to the police or take a lie detector test.
With this and other evidence, they were able to get the former
girlfriend to confess that the suspect had in fact brought the victim to her house. The former girlfriend had photographed Ignatow sexually abusing the woman and, after Ignatow killed the
woman, the former girlfriend helped bury the body in her backyard. The police then excavated the backyard and discovered
Schaefer's body.
Obviously, these were people of no great fame, but of solid
middle-class status in the community, and there was a great deal
of publicity. As you might expect, there was a change of venue
from the Louisville area to an area about a hundred miles away,
in the Kentucky suburbs of Cincinnati. There was then a jury
trial, and to the vast dismay of the people in the Louisville area,
Mr. Ignatow was acquitted. Eighteen days later, he was indicted
in federal court for perjury, based on his statements before a federal grand jury that he had not committed the murder. Approximately one year later, the people who had bought the house in
which Mr. Ignatow had lived at the time of the murder decided to
take up the carpet and re-lay it. Under a heating vent, they
found a plastic bag containing the victim's jewelry and three rolls
of film showing Ignatow doing everything the ex-girlfriend had
described in her testimony. Within seventy-two hours, he
pleaded guilty to perjury in federal court and was sentenced to
seven years, five of which he actually served. He was recently
released, but he has now been re-indicted by the state court for
perjury at the trial of the boss that I mentioned earlier. There,
he had made statements to the effect that he loved the woman
and that their relationship was perfectly fine. The question of
the publicity and the effect of the media on a fair trial, on this
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second state perjury charge, if Mr. Ignatow indeed does go to
trial, will be extremely interesting.
I turn now to the panel itself, which I notice features both
Dean Stone and Professor Strauss,' in what must be one of their
first public appearances together since their defense of President
Clinton before the Supreme Court. Equally provocative, I am
sure, will be Stephen Jones, 27 the lawyer for Timothy McVeigh,
and Peter Arenella," the well-known commentator on the O.J.
Simpson trial and on publicity in the courtroom as a whole, particularly with respect to televising cases. As I read the advance
notice, it appears that all of these people will be relatively skeptical of the usefulness or desirability of wide publicity, and especially of televising trials, in the fair trial context. It does not appear that anyone is going to take a strong stand on the side of the
media. But Mr. Jones makes a compelling case for the difficulties
he encountered in the McVeigh case due to publicity. I think it is
intriguing to compare the effect on the attitudes of the outside
publicity in the O.J. Simpson case, the McVeigh case, and the
very recent Louise Woodward case (the so-called "Boston Nanny
case").
It seems to me that in many ways massive publicity brings
the facts of the individual case into a national storytelling context, as the phrase is used in the law reviews today.29 Thus, as
Mr. Jones will maintain, one can certainly see the McVeigh case
within the context of a pre-ordained media guilty verdict. But it
also can be seen as bringing potential jurors within the similarly
media-ordained story of the brave and independent jurors who
are ready to seize upon the twists of plot that are brought into the
jury room by the clever defense lawyer. 0
That story, too, is highly ingrained in our consciousness, and
it could be argued that such a story played a major role, as much
as the race issue, in the Simpson trial. Certainly from Perry Ma' David A Strauss, Why It's Not Free Speech Versus FairTrial, 1998 U Chi Legal F
109. Dean Geoffrey Stone served as a moderator.
Douglas G. Baird, Fee Clarification,Chi Trib 22A (Nov 24, 1996).
Stephen Jones and Holly Hillerman, McVeigh, McJustice, McMedia, 1998 U Chi
Legal F 53.
Peter Arenella, The Perils of TVLegalPunditry, 1998 U Chi Legal F 25.
See, for example, Charles R. Lawrence, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as
Scholarshipas Struggle, 65 S Cal L Rev 2231, 2278 11130 (1992); Kenneth B. Nunn, The
TrialAs Text: Allegory, Myth and Symbol in the AdversarialCriminalProcess- A Critique
of the Role ofthe Public Defender and a Proposalfor Reform, 32 Am Crim L Rev 743, 745 n
7(1995).
See, for example, Nichols jurorssay most voted for death penalty, Chi Trib 8A (Jan
11, 1998) (describing jurors' varied reactions to trial proceedings).
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son to L.A Law to my favorite of this genre, My Cousin Vinny,
the story of the apparent mass of evidence that melts away in the
face of the brave, clever lawyer is one that publicity can lead us to
believe as well. In the McVeigh and Simpson trials, jurors were
largely of different colors, perhaps of different background sympathies, and perhaps of different potential sources of suspicion of
the authorities. But, it seems to me that part of the story told in
each case was that jurors should be suspicious of seemingly overwhelming evidence. Thus, we should think about whether the
difference was in publicity, or perhaps in the process of jury selection. Or, if the trial judges had been reversed in the two trials,
even in the face of identical publicity, would the results have been
different?
I think we may give away too much if we see such publicity as
contributing to a loss of confidence in the legal system. Only in a
fairy tale could people believe that the legal system never makes
errors. When you have two sets of very competent, very combative, and very verbal people (the lawyers) taking opposing sides of
an issue, it is inevitable that each of them will, to some degree,
persuade people to the rightness of their cause. That being the
case, it is inevitable that in any individual case, many citizens
will think the wrong decision was made. That is simply part of
the process. I think that the citizenry as a whole, after some period of over-agitation, remembers and settles down to a belief
that the system can and does operate reasonably well, even if the
evidence that they get from their television set causes them to
believe that it may have erred in a given case.
I think the recent and ongoing case of the British au pair has
been intriguing in that it has acquired much more notoriety in
the tabloid press and TV shows than I might have imagined,
while not having achieved that profile in the more serious press.
I was struck by the fact that public interest was sufficient enough
that one internet poll on the question of whether the nanny's sentence was too harsh received over nine thousand votes.3 And the
nine thousand, by two-to-one, thought the sentence was too
harsh.32 Of course, this is simply an indication of interest and not
an objection to that interest. And there was no serious question
that the publicity there had any direct impact on the jury.
It is also intriguing that the publicity and furor has, if any"1 Annette Cardwell, The Louise Woodward Verdict: In Cyberspace, Majority Feel
Nanny Wronged, Boston Herald 4 (Nov 1, 1997).
2

Id.
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thing, intensified through the coverage of the judge's hearing on
whether to overturn the verdict.' Judge Zobel agreed to put his
ruling out on the Internet so that it would be available immediately all over the country as soon as it was given in court.' This
brings me back to the theme I mentioned about remembering the
role of the judge in each of the issue areas. In fact, the greatest
television ratings of all seem to come from pseudo-court shows
featuring bench trials, in the form of Judge Wapner of The People's Court, and now Judge Judy and her Court of Common
Sense. This is probably because, by their very nature, bench trials are less diffuse, are better paced, and have a central protagonist in a way that is much more difficult for jury trials to achieve.
Finally, I would be somewhat remiss or self-serving not to
mention the fact that massive publicity in a bench trial focuses
that pressure on a person who has, or at least may hope to have,
very extensive future reliance on the reputation that he or she
acquires through that publicity. While an individual juror, even
in the most high-profile case, may at most get some very fleeting
fame (and possibly income) from revelations about the case, it is
certain that five years from now, or even tomorrow, no one will
actually remember, for good or ill, a single juror from that case.
By contrast, publicity from a high-profile case will undoubtedly
massively multiply the number of people who will be aware of the
judge involved, and who at least believe that they have some basis for an opinion of him or her. While we should expect judges to
be firmer in their resistance to pressure caused by publicity, we
should also recognize that the impact may well be greater on a
judge than on any individual juror.
B. Race and the Criminal Jury Trial
I will turn now to the second panel on the role of race in trials,
and especially the consideration of jurors' race and racial attitudes. It seems that we will have two interesting, perhaps opposing, views - from Jeffery Rosen,35 a writer and professor (certainly a very prolific popular writer), and Professor Deborah Ramirez." Professor Abramson,37 the third panelist, states well the
See Monica Collins, Nanny Walks: Viewers on Roller CoasterRide of Justice,Boston
Herald 25 (Nov 11, 1997) (recounting media coverage of the judge's decision).
Tom Mashberg, Legal Showdown: No Matter How Judge Rules, Nanny Case Will Be
Appealed, Boston Herald 1 (Nov 10, 1997).
See Jeffrey Rosen, After 'One Angry Woman', 1998 U Chi Legal F 179.
Deborah Ramirez, Affirmative Jury Selection: A Proposal to Advance Both the DeliberativeIdeal and Jury Diversity, 1998 U Chi Legal F 161.
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tension between the view of the jury or juror as essentially an
impartial arbiter and the juror as a representative of the commu38
nity.
The contribution by Professor Ramirez is at once interesting,
provocative, and (to me) profoundly disturbing in its theoretical
implications. It builds on her 1994 article in Boston University
Law Review, which unearths the historical concept of the mixed
jury with the wonderfully interesting and provocative title The
Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of Trial by Jury de Meditate
Linguae. 9 If I correctly recall Mrs. Holland's third-year Latin,
Professor Ramirez refers to a jury of mixed tongues - a jury half
of the foreigner's community and half of the native community for trials involving traders or others in an area where they are
strangers. But it is historically predicated on a situation in
which the defendant was clearly a foreigner, being tried in another country, a person who was outside the political community,
and who acquired his rights and obligations by means of a law
separate from that controlling and binding the regular members
of the community." While that is perhaps the ultimate logic of a
number of commentators on race in our legal system, both academic and political, to me it is violently at odds both with our
prevailing ethos and with political reality. Although blacks and
whites remain distinct in many areas of our society, and perhaps
are distinguishable on an aggregate statistical basis in many
more areas, the political reality is that even the most vocally
radical want into the system, not out of it. When Al Sharpton is
no longer simply a street demonstrator, but an extremely serious
political candidate in our nation's largest city,4 and when his actions at the time of defeat are those of any other reasonable politico who looks to a future,4 2 we are not at the stage of wanting or
needing to declare the black citizens of our country as being, in
fact, strangers to our legal system.
An extreme version of the proposal, where defendants would
be guaranteed half the jurors of their group, however that group
would be defined, also would raise the interesting question of
Jeffrey Abramson, Two Ideals of Jury Deliberation,1998 U Chi Legal F 125.
Jeffrey Abramson, We, The Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal of Democracy
(Harper Collins 1994).
Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of Trial by Jury de
Mediatate Linguae: A History and a Proposalfor Change, 74 BU L Rev 777 (1994).
41

Id at 783-85.

" Vivian S. Toy, Al SharptonAnnounces Candidacy,NY Times 6B (Jan 21, 1997).
42 Jonathan P. Hicks, Messinger Gets Vow of Support from Sharpton, NY Times 1A
(Sept 29, 1997).
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whether such a system would be thrust upon a defendant who did
not want it, and whether the jurors themselves would know that
this type of system was being used. The more extensive and nuanced proposal that Professor Ramirez presents, I think, contains
a number of useful variations and helpful modifications, allowing,
for example, affirmative peremptory choices, rather than peremptory challenges, of jurors. But for me her proposal continues to
founder on the basic concept that people could go into the jury
room labeled as jurors of a certain sort, whether by ethnic background, or as the prosecution's juror, or as the defendant's juror.
In any event, as Judge Kleinfeld of the Ninth Circuit memorably
observed, "[t]hought comes from the brain, not the blood."43 Various tactics could be adopted to try to keep the labels from being
known, but I strongly suspect the jurors would be smart enough
to figure out what was going on.
In connection with the issue of race in the jury room, I also
want to consider the jury as representative of the community,
and not just of the defendant's peers. Much of our legal scholarship and decisions rest on the concept of avoiding the "all-white"
jury. This concept naturally possesses tremendous emotional
power coming as it does with the cognitive baggage of centuries in
the South, a place where black persons would be tried by a jury
that was not at all representative of the community in which the
crime was committed. This was generally a community in which
the victim and the defendant both lived, where juries would be
100 percent white, but the community was 20, 40, or 60 percent
black.
But the phrase should, in fact, have a different connotation in
principle, if we are speaking of an all-white jury in Vermont or
Wyoming or parts of rural Kentucky, where the community is, in
fact, overwhelmingly white. There, it is not only the defendant
but the society that is entitled to a jury, in the words of the Sixth
Amendment, "of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed."' And society will recognize that a representative jury may, in fact, be all white.
Statistics tell us that, when drawn perfectly at random from a
community that is 10 percent minority, more than a quarter of
the time, a fairly-chosen jury of twelve would contain no minorities. In a 5 percent minority area that would happen well over

Monterey Mechanical Co v Wilson, 138 F3d 2170, 2172 (9th Cir 1998).
US Const, Amend VI.
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half the time. 5 And, of course, the converse would be true in the
District of Columbia or certain cities that are overwhelmingly
black. The fact is that race is only one of many relevant and useful characteristics of a juror. Ceterisparibus, "other things being
equal," I agree that it is true that a black juror may add something that a twelfth white juror would not, and vice versa. But
the same is true of college graduates as opposed to the uneducated, of entrepreneurs versus government bureaucrats, or of a
twelfth person who was, perhaps, a Jew or a Mormon. We cannot
get, in any twelve-person jury, all of the characteristics that exist
in society.
Now it is true that consideration of more points of view and
skills and experiences will be likely if we draw from a larger
population area. This is one reason why it is generally thought
that federal juries will be more broadly representative than state
juries, simply because they are drawn from a much wider area.
In contemplating that, it is interesting, however, to recognize the
opportunities for what some would call jury-mandering if these
choices are made post hoc. There is, of course, the relatively obscure section of the Sixth Amendment that follows the language
that I just quoted, which states that you are entitled to a jury of
the state and district, "which district shall have been previously
ascertainedby law."' So I think those are considerations to keep
in mind in the "jury-mandering" context.
C. Overproceduralism and its Consequences
I now turn briefly to the panel on procedure and overproceduralism, the panel I find the easiest to address. Conventionally, we always have topics like: "Procedure, boon or bane?" I
was struck by two wonderful literary opposites here. Many of us
know the scene in A Man for All Seasons where Thomas More is
talking to his son-in-law Roper:
More:
What would you do? Cut a great road through
the law to get after the Devil?
Roper:

rd cut down every law in England to do that.

More:

Oh? And when the last law was down, and the

s .912 = .28; .9512 = .54.
US Const, Amend VI (emphasis added).
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Devil turned round on you - where would you hide,
Roper, the laws all being flat? This country's planted
thick with laws from coast to coast - man's laws, not
God's - and if you cut them down... d'you really think
you could stand upright in the winds that would blow
then? Yes, rd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own
safety's sake.47

Well, now, that's very nice rhetoric on one side. Conversely,
my revered contracts Professor, Grant Gilmore, took the other
side in saying that, in truth, "[in Heaven, there will be no law
and the lion will lie down with the lamb....

The worse the soci-

ety, the more law there will be. In Hell, there will be nothing but
law, and due process will be meticulously observed."' I mention
these two polar views for you to think about as we consider overproceduralism.
Most of the procedure materials that will be presented in this
forum, as I see them, primarily relate to questions of social policy,
rather than fair trials in a strict sense. Both Professor Livingston's paper 9 and the Meares and Kahan paper seem to me to
address aspects of police crime control policies. These are certainly very grave and important questions relating to the interaction between police and citizens in our society, and those interactions are governed and moderated by a wide variety of factors. In
part, because of the growing minority political power that is described by Meares and Kahan, it.may well be that such factors as
political oversight, public pressure, and the threat of tort liability
are much more important in influencing and controlling such contacts than are the fair trial considerations brought into play almost exclusively through Fourth Amendment suppression motions. These issues are better considered under the rubric of a
fair society rather than a fair trial. After all, again and again,
even those who are advocating the suppression of evidence in a
particular case generally take the position that the evidence
might very well have been fairly and legally gathered, had the
police simply taken other or better steps in their investigation.
Thus, in a very significant sense, when you focus narrowly on the
Robert Bolt, A Man ForAll Seasons 66 (Random House 1962).
Grant Gilmore, The Ages ofAmerican Law 111 (Yale 1977).
4' See Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking,and the Fourth Amendment,
1998 U Chi Legal F 261.
' See Tracey L. Meares and Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural
Thinking: A Critiqueof Chicago v Morales, 1998 U Chi Legal F 197.
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trial, the trial would be "fair" with or without the suppression of
the evidence, and in most cases might be fairer with the evidence,
in the sense of closer to the truth-seeking function. It is, however, from the perspective of a just society that we are rightly
more concerned with police practices.
Certainly, from a judge's perspective, the multifarious stages
of police-citizen interaction, from full arrest, to stop and frisk, to
consensual encounter are very interestingly and well laid out in
Professor Livingston's contribution. Her contrast of New York
and federal practice, I think, is most instructive.
In federal law, we primarily have the duality, starting with
Terry v Ohio,51 of probable cause and reasonable suspicion,52 while
in New York law we have specific control of even earlier stages of
consensual encounter - starting with the simple inquiry, and
moving on to more intrusive questioning - before we even reach
reasonable suspicion.' But I would note that some commentators
and judges in my circuit have indicated that there we may exfoliate the doctrine even further to a stage prior to the consensual
encounter, which can be characterized as the "pre-contact" stage,
before an officer even speaks to a person. In this regard, you may
want to look at an interesting case just decided in our circuit,
United States v Avery.' Since it has come out just recently, it
also reminds me of the one great advantage of judges over legal
scholars: when we are ready to publish, we can publish the next
day!
This case lays out one point of view as to the control of police
action at the "pre-contact" stage. Mr. Avery was walking through
the Cincinnati Airport and attracted the attention of some officers. There is a dispute as to whether the attention was just because he was a young black male, or because he was carrying a
duffel bag, was wearing sweat pants and a short-sleeved shirt in
December, and was focused straight ahead, "like a man on a mission."55 In any event, at first the officers did not approach him or
encounter him at all. They simply followed him through the airport to see where he was going. He went to a gate area, walked
immediately to the podium, sat down, and waited. The officers
"

392 US 1 (1968).

Id at 27.
See, for example, People v Hollman, 590 NE2d 204, 205-06 (NY 1992). For a -discussion of new issues in police-citizen interaction, see Debra Livingston, Police Discretion
and the Quality of Life in PublicPlaces: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97
Colum L Rev 551 (1997).
128 F3d 974 (6th Cir 1997).
Id at 977, quoting Officer Parker.
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were intrigued. They went to the airline desk, where they were
told that he bought his ticket with cash thirty-five minutes before
departing from San Juan, on a flight connecting through Orlando
and Cincinnati on its way to Washington. The officers then got
on the plane, and did everything by the book; they didn't block
Avery's exit but only asked to talk to him. He didn't say he'd
been to San Juan; he said he'd come from Orlando. He said he'd
stayed there but he didn't have any receipts. His ticket was in
somebody else's name, and so on and so on. A fairly standard
Fourth Amendment kind of case,5 6 except for the question raised
by two of the judges as to whether the pre-contact stage could be
controlled under an Equal Protection analysis. In other words, if
the officer could be shown to have followed Mr. Avery because he
was black, rather than because of the "gym bag, focused walk,
etc." sort of thing, would this be a violation controllable by suppression of the evidence?
As it turned out, even though the court's opinion discussed
the possibilities at some considerable length, it didn't find that it
applied here, so there is a brief concurrence by me saying that I
think this is all dicta.57 But I put the paradigmatic question as
follows:
An officer on routine foot patrol walks east on First Street
behind two men, one black and one white. First Street
dead-ends into Main, so at the corner of First and Main
each man, and the officer, must turn right or left. The
black man turns one way; the white man turns the other.
The officer chooses to turn the corner to follow one of the
men and, when questioned later, candidly admits that he
had no reason for deciding to go right rather than left save
the race of the man who also turned that way. However,
within a block of turning the corner, the officer sees the
man rob a store, and arrests the man. My intuition is that
the evidence of that robbery could not be suppressed.
However, that intuition is no less dicta than most of the
discussion in Part II B of the court's opinion. 8
I add that to the level of detail that Professor Livingston has very
See Comment, Fourth Amendment Seizure: The ProperStandard for Appellate
Review, 18 Wm Mitchell L Rev 829, 840-41 & n 42 (1992) (describing the basic features of
a Fourth Amendment seizure).
128 F3d at 988 (Boggs concurring).
Id at 988-89.
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carefully and accurately laid out.
Meares and Kahan have a very interesting presentation on
the interaction of rights and politics. As I would state it in an
oversimplified way, I read them to say that policies condemned as
unconstitutional in the 1960s and 1970s (such as curfews, loitering ordinances, mass searches in public housing) might be fine
now that we have a "Nineties Mentality" rather than the "Sixties
Mentality."5 9 While I agree that it may be seen as an important
difference that a larger proportion of the population in minority
areas may support the police today than in the 1960s, I think
both the extent and significance of this shift can be overstated. It
is a commonplace even today, from recent evidence, that black
jurors may be less inclined to trust police than whites." On the
other hand, a concentration of both crime and police activity in
minority communities also existed significantly in the sixties.
Meares and Kahan emphasize that majorities of people living in
crime-plagued minority communities, measured both by political
representation and, in the case of the Chicago Housing Authority,
by votes of building residents themselves, have supported more
aggressive police measures.6 '
Although Meares and Kahan chastise "suburban liberal
ACLU types" for bringing these suits, even with today's relaxed
standing rules, the challengers must have at least some genuinely affected parties from the affected community as clients.2 I
read the thrust of their argument as being that, to the extent that
a "Sixties Mentality" premises legal decisions on political judgments about the significance and effect of police actions, when
those political judgments change, the rulings could change as
well. I am not sure that those original rulings should have been
made on such grounds, but insofar as judges who made them did
so, I believe that Meares and Kahan may have raised some intriguing points that bear consideration. And yet, at bottom, I
must adhere to the traditional view that the rights in principle
come from God or from nature and in practice from the Constitu" See Dan M. Kahan, Between Economicsand Sociology: The New Path of Deterrence,
95 Mich L Rev 2477, 2478-79 (1997) (explaining how deterrence scholarship justifies a
legal response to shifts in social norms).
1995 Sourcebook at 133 (cited in note 16) (while 65 percent of white respondents
expressed "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the police, only 31 percent of black

respondents had this much confidence).
See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning and Deterrence, 83 Va L Rev
349, 393 & n 160 (1997).
See, for example, Lee v Boardof Governors ofFederalReserve System, 118 F3d 905,
910-11 (2d Cir 1997) (dismissing suit for lack of standing).
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tion, rather than from the votes of the day. For this proposition I
would quote (some might think it an unlikely source) Justice
Scalia speaking for the dissenters (himself, Brennan, Marshall,
and Stevens) in the case of Maryland v Craig," which upheld the
ability of the state to present child-victim molestation evidence by
closed-circuit television. After going through some of the political
disputes on such testimony, Scalia said:
I have no need to defend the value of confrontation, because the Court has no authority to question it. It is not
within our charge to speculate that . . . confrontation
might 'in fact disserve the Confrontation Clause's truthseeking goal.' If so, that is a defect in the Constitution...
[that] cannot be corrected by judicial pronouncement that
it is archaic, contrary to 'widespread belief,' and thus null
and void. .

.

.

The Court today has applied interest-

balancing analysis where the text of the Constitution simply does not permit it.... The Court has convincingly
proved that the Maryland procedure serves a valid interest, and gives the defendant virtually everything the Confrontation Clause guarantees (everything, that is, except
confrontation).
I am persuaded, therefore, that the
Maryland procedure is virtually constitutional. Since it is
not, however, actually constitutional, I would affirm the
judgment of the Maryland Court of Appeals reversing the
judgment of conviction.'
Well, I must confess to being an old fuddy-duddy and taking the
Scalia-Brennan side of that argument.
I would also say that the sub-categorization of communities
points up again, as in the race area, the troublesome nature of
viewing ourselves as two communities or many communities,
rather than as one America. As an example, in my own city of
Louisville, the question of a teen curfew was recently widely debated.' As Kahan indicates on the issue of teen curfews in San
Antonio and other cities," there was significant support for such
laws in Louisville from minority communities, though in fact the
City Council was divided (not, I hasten to add, solely along racial
497 US 836 (1990).
Id at 869-70 (Scalia dissenting) (emphasis added).
See Mary O'Doherty, Revised City-Curfew ProposalIncludes Special Police Unit,
Courier-J (Louisville) B2 (July 27, 1994).
See, for example, Kahan, 83 Va L Rev at 372 n 85 (cited in note 61).
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lines). Our twelve person board of aldermen has four black members and eight whites. The whites from what we used to call the
silk-stocking areas opposed the ordinance. 7 The five whites from
the more working-class areas supported the ordinance. Would
the logical extension of the Meares-Kahan theory be that the ordinance is valid if all four black alderman voted for it, but not if
they had all voted against it? And what about the plausible case
where some of the representatives of the minority community
supported it and some opposed it? It seems to me to be extremely
dangerous to let ultimate legal decisions turn on such nosecounting of the nature of the representatives, rather than of the
nature of the measure under consideration.
CONCLUSION

To summarize, frequently I may seem to have mini-mied the
potential magnitude of the changes that either allegedly justify
reforms or that would result from reforms. In part, I did that, but
not to belittle the possibility of improvement, only to caution
against expecting too much. It is perhaps a truism to say, "Be
careful of that for which you wish, for you may, in fact, get it."
For example, Professor Steiker once wrote a very interesting article on death-penalty proceduralism." He notes that more and
more procedures were put in, frankly with an eye to undermining
the possibility of and support for the death penalty.69 Ultimately

he finds that perhaps they have facilitated and strengthened
support for the death penalty. 0 But for myself, I take away from
my encounter with all of this some traditional lessons.
The fair trial is still a search for truth, with the appropriate
pro-defendant discount where the defendant runs the risk of the
deprivation of his liberty, a result we do not take lightly in a free
society. But that search for truth is the key attitude of the jurors
that we should seek.
I take the lesson that judges, especially today, generally will
not impose broad social reforms not tied to a particular constitu' See Todd Murphy, Bather Again to Try for Youth Curfew, with New Provisions,
Courier-J (Louisville) BI (June 2, 1994). See also Sheldon S. Shafer, Louisville Youth
Curfew is Approved: Yearlong Trial Set to Start on March 31, Courier-J (Louisville) Al
(Feb 12, 1997).
' Carol S. Steiker and Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on
Two Decades of ConstitutionalRegulation of Capital Punishment, 109 Harv L Rev 355
(1995).
Id at 438.
70 Id.
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tional text, as was to some extent the legacy of the 1960s. Legislative and executive action may be a more fruitful field than constitutional interpretation for some of the reforms that commentators are suggesting. But overall a search for the truth is what we
should try to strengthen as the best way to preserve a sensiblydefined free trial right. That is a process that scholarship, such
as is presented in the other papers in this forum, can well advance.

